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James Stone of German historians reassessed the war scare of 1875. They were more critical of Germany's role in this international crisis and made far greater use of journalistic sources 4 . However these scholars tended to take the sensational outpourings of the government press at face value. A combination of this rather naive use of source material and a desire to distance themselves from Germany's past led these researchers to conclude that the war scare of 1875 was part of a sinister plan to permanently secure the German Empire's position in Europe. According to this view the crisis was the result of Bismarck's attempt to force Fiance to accept limitations on the size of her army and to partition Austria-Hungary with Russia. Although it is difficult to bring this hypothesis in line with the rest of German foreign policy during the mid-1870s it has not been convincingly challenged. Doubts have been expressed 5 , but no adequate alternate explanation has been put forward. The objective of the following re-examination of the crisis is to offer an interpretation of German aims that allows the events of the spring of 1875 to be understood as part of Bismarck's entire political system in the 1870s.
From a methodological point of view the revisionists' focus upon the German government's use of the press during the war scare represented a step forward. The most salient feature of the diplomatic crisis in 1875 was without a doubt the prominent role played by the newspaper media. Much of the panic was caused by the publication of a series of alarming reports in newspapers known to be under Bismarck's control. However little real analysis of the content and underlying tactical objectives of the articles themselves has been done 6 . In particular the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Bismarck's use of public diplomacy has been overlooked: German threats of war were aimed primarily at groups outside of government. Although the press was often used during this period as a tool in the diplomatic chess game, its real power lay in the ability to bypass official channels and to speak directly to the populations of foreign countries. And this was how Bismarck sought to use his mercenary journalists in the spring of 1875. The war scare was in reality a massive attempt to influence the course of domestic politics in Paris and Vienna. In a sensational way it revealed a fundamental fact about German foreign policy in the 1870s: The German chancellor was preoccupied with supporting certain political groups within France and Austria-Hungary.
After 1871 Bismarck's primary goal in western Europe was to keep France weak and diplomatically isolated. He felt that the most effective way to attain this goal was by promoting the establishment of a liberal republic 7 . The German chancellor foresaw that a republican government would have a great deal of difficulty entering into an alliance with the conservative empires of eastern Europe and would promote internal dissension. For these reasons the chancellor supported president Adolphe Thiers, a pragmatic republican, in the years after the conclusion of peace. However in May 1873 this German strategy suffered a major setback when the leader of the monarchist majority in the National Assembly, Marshal MacMahon, replaced Thiers. The new conservative administration made France more attractive as an ally and its mandate was to put an end to the republican constitution. Therefore after May 1873 Bismarck's French policy was directed not only at preventing the restoration of a monarchy but also at undermining the position of MacMahon to make way for a pro-republican government.
In the case of Austria-Hungary Bismarck wished not only to prevent her from allying with France but also to block an Austro-Russian entente outside of the Three Emperors' League. He believed that the dualistic constitution created by the Ausgleich in 1867 offered the best means of achieving this objective. The division of the Habsburg Empire into two equal halves had given Hungary more power and Hungarian interests dictated a close alliance with Germany 8 . Hungary still resented Russia for her role in the suppression of the 1848 revolution and felt threatened by St. Petersburg's support of Panslavism on the Balkan peninsula. In Budapest there was also little interest in an alliance with France which could only lead to a restoration of Austria's position in Germany and a return to more centralized control of the empire. After 1871 Bismarck therefore encouraged stronger Hungarian influence over Austrian foreign policy. The appointment of the Hungarian prime minister, Julius Andrássy, as foreign minister in November 1871 represented the first major success of this strategy and offered Germany additional guarantees for a lasting friendship with Austria.
However by 1873 Bismarck was already becoming concerned about the reliability of the partnership with the Dual Monarchy. Hungary's position within the empire was being undermined by a deepening financial crisis. Budapest was no longer able to fulfill her financial obligations under the compromise of 1867 and as a result the entire dualistic constitution appeared to be threatened 9 . At the same time the forces advocating centralism and a war of revenge against Germany seemed to be increasing their influence over the Austrian emperor Francis Joseph. Rumors began to circulate that Andrássy, the architect of dualism, would soon be replaced. The situation appeared to have reached a critical juncture in the first months of 1875. Reports received in the Wilhelmstrasse from the German ambassador in Vienna and from Austrian intelligence agents indicated that Andrassy's dismissal was imminent and would be followed by a major change of political direction in Vienna. These warnings were corroborated by increasingly open attacks on dualism and the alliance with Germany by reactionary forces in Austria 10 . As a result Bismarck became convinced at the beginning of 1875 that the system of dualism, one of the cornerstones of his political system, was in grave danger.
At the same time a monarchist restoration was being planned in Paris. After the failure to restore the Bourbon pretender, the Count of Chambord, in the fall of 1873 the hopes of French royalists were focused upon the house of Orleans. And in the winter of 1874/75 there was a major effort underway to place a member of that family on the vacant French throne. At the beginning of 1875 President MacMahon was contemplating a coup d'état to put an Orleanist prince on the throne and to prevent the passage of constitutional legislation designed to make the republican form of government in France permanent 11 . In preparing for this action, MacMahon and his supporters were particularly anxious to secure Russian support. They made direct appeals to the tsar requesting that he give his blessing to the planned coup. The princes of Orleans assisted these efforts by instructing their Polish relatives to distance themselves from any anti-Russian agitation in order to cultivate the favor of Alexander II. Of course these moves did not go unnoticed in Berlin where they caused some alarm 12 . Although the crisis appeared to pass following the acceptance of the constitutional laws in February 1875, reports continued to be received in Berlin indicating that some kind of Orleanist coup was still being prepared. The Count of Paris, the leading Orleanist pretender, was now planning to seize power legally by first being elected as president of the new senate 13 . Particularly unsettling from a German point of view were indications that Leon Gambetta, the leader of the republicans, had decided to support the Orleanist candidacy.
The simultaneous threat of internal upheavals in Vienna and Paris posed a difficult dilemma for Bismarck. The danger to his political system appeared so great that he wished to intervene but his ability to influence the course of French and Austrian internal politics was limited. Any overt attempt to take sides would almost certainly have helped his enemies in both countries. At a purely diplomatic level he could attempt to use German political power to secure victories for Andrássy and inflict defeats on MacMahon in order to im- 15 . The chancellor secured the backing of the emperor and the federal states for this alarming measure by arguing that he did not wish to assist French rearmament and that Germany might miss so many quality steeds if she were forced to mobilize in the near future. These arguments were more justification than cause for the embargo, but there was a strong case to be made for some action. It was a well-known fact that the French army needed about 20,000 horses to complete its military reorganization and that her internal resources were insufficient to meet the need. At the same time the Bavarian army did not have enough mounts to equip its forces on a wartime footing 16 . Therefore Germany had two good reasons to protect her supply of horses from French buyers. However these military considerations alone did not lead Bismarck to issue the decree. This move was not initiated by the German army, which suggests that it was not overly concerned by reports of planned French purchases. Indeed the German military attache in Paris expressed doubts that the embargo would have any real effect on the pace of the French arms build-up 17 . In addition there was a danger that closing Germany's borders to horse traders would jeopardize the German army's own supply of mounts. In fact the embargo was lifted at the beginning of 1876 in response to pressure from German horse breeders 14 whose existence and ability to supply the army were threatened by the decline in prices caused by the ban 18 . It was primarily because of developments within France and Austria that Bismarck decided to impose the ban on 4 March. An embargo on the export of horses was usually the first step in mobilizing for war. There was therefore an implicit threat of war in the decree which was directed primarily at France. The resulting increase in Franco-German tensions could not help but impact French politics. In particular the conservative administration in France would be more conscious of German sensibilities when making domestic political decisions. And after the Arnim affair there could be little doubt in Paris that Germany would strongly oppose any anti-republican coup. Nevertheless Bismarck sought to indirectly explain the political meaning of his action to French leaders. In a conversation with the Frankophile Russian ambassador in Berlin, Paul Oubril, about the reasons for the embargo the German chancellor noted that there were groups in France that believed a war with Germany would lead to a restoration of the monarchy 19 . Bismarck probably hoped that these words would find their way to Paris and make clear to French monarchists that the belligerent German actions were linked to Orleanist efforts to seize power. In fact almost all of OubriPs report on this meeting was communicated to the French government with the exception of the remarks linking the war scare to royalist intrigues 20 . Clearly the Russians had no interest in assisting German attempts to support the French republic. Presumably the chancellor used other, more effective unofficial channels to convey the same message to conservative French politicians.
Bismarck also exploited the tense atmosphere created by the embargo to make indirect threats of preventive war against Austria. During a conversation with the British ambassador in Berlin, Odo Russell, on 9 March the German chancellor revealed his concern that developments in Vienna could lead to the formation of a Franco-Austrian alliance 21 . At the same time he assured Russell that he did not fear this combination. If Andrássy were to be removed from power, the chancellor explained, then he would simply emulate Frederick the Great and launch a pre-emptive strike against Vienna in order to destroy the coalition in its infancy. In this statement the intention of using the threat of preventive war to influence domestic Austrian politics was much more obvious than similar warnings to France. But the tactics were essentially the same. -Bismarck chose to issue this strong warning through Russell for two reasons. Firstly, he no doubt assumed that the British foreign secretary, Lord Derby, would pass Russell's account of the conversation on to the Austrian ambassador in London, Count Ferdinand von Beust. As foreign minister for Saxony and later as Austrian chancellor Beust had led the fight to prevent Prussian dominance of Germany. After his dismissal in 1871 he continued to be the focus for groups in Austria seek-ing to reverse the result of the war of 1866 22 . Bismarck's threats were therefore intended to intimidate his old Saxon nemesis and to force him to stop conspiring against Andrássy. He probably also counted on Russell's lack of discretion to broadcast his words to key individuals at court and in the diplomatic corps at Berlin who would pass it on to the intended audience in Vienna. Certainly Russell saw to it that the chancellor's threats came to the attention of key decision-makers in Berlin and Vienna 23 .
This initial flurry of saber-rattling surrounding the export embargo was followed by a month of uneasy calm. Rumors of war persisted but there were no further incidents. Attention shifted during this period to German protests in Brussels and Rome over clerical interference in the Kulturkampf.
These conflicts on the periphery of European politics helped to keep the diplomatic atmosphere tense but were not directly linked to Bismarck's attempts to use the threat of war to intimidate French and Austrian reactionaries. However two events occurred during this lull in the storm that were to become important in the second phase of the crisis. tant reason for the change in the law than the 1200 captains who would have otherwise lost their commissions. Military analysts noted that if the creation of the fourth battalions were combined with the introduction of large peacetime companies then France could not long endure the resulting financial burden. If, on the other hand, larger companies were not created, then the law indicated a conscious decision to sacrifice the quality of training for some short-term objective. As a result the law was seen by many, including the German general staff, as an ad hoc step designed to put as many men in the field as quickly as possible to wage a war of revenge 26 .
For Bismarck the excitement over the Cadres law came at a very opportune moment. He may have had some genuine concerns about the speed at which the French army was rebuilding itselP, but he never actually believed that French rearmament posed a threat to peace. However he felt that it would be politically useful to convince certain target groups in Austria and France that he did 28 . In particular the anxiety over French armaments placed him in a position to intensify the war scare in response to new reports of impending domestic political change in Paris and Vienna. Amongst these communications it was primarily a letter from an Austrian intelligence agent received at the beginning of April that spurred him to take stronger action 29 . According to this source Andrassy's fall was now imminent and would be followed by a radical realignment of Austrian foreign policy. He also reported that political leaders in Vienna believed that a major shift of power was about to occur in Paris. This last observation was confirmed by a report from the German ambassador in Vienna, Lothar von Schweinitz, who noted at the end of March that Orleanist agents were active in Vienna seeking support for a restoration of the monarchy in France 30 .
The planned change of political direction in Vienna gave the meeting in Venice greater political significance. The Austro-Italian detente meant that an important obstacle to a reactionary coup in Vienna might no longer be in place. Up until that point the government in Rome had shared Bismarck's interest in supporting Andrássy in order to prevent the Austrian clericals from taking power because it feared that such a regime might use force to restore the pope's temporal power 31 . In view of the improved relations between both powers this no longer appeared to be the case. In addition there were indications that the Italian government was about to reach an accord with Pope Pius IX ending years of conflict 32 . This development threatened to further erode Italian interest in opposing con- servative forces in Vienna or Paris. Thus the danger of Austria falling into the hands of the centralist faction was greatly increased by the rapprochement with Italy. The simultaneous threat of an Orleanist restoration in France made the situation appear even more hazardous for Germany's international position. The chancellor therefore decided to use the passage of the Cadres law and the meeting in Venice as occasions to sound the alarm.
The first step in this risky campaign to intensify the panic was the publication of a lead article in the Kölnische Zeitung. Ludwig Aegedi, head of the press section in the German Foreign Office, sent the draft to the editor of the paper asking him to print it verbatim because every word had been weighed »as if it were a state document« 33 . The article appeared on 5 April, the day of the meeting in Venice, under the title »New Alliances«. It was written as a report from a correspondent in Vienna which reflected both the intelligence source that had prompted the German action and Bismarck's own preoccupation with Austrian domestic politics. The fictional Viennese correspondent captured the attention of his readers by announcing that the outbreak of war was nearer at hand than was generally believed. France was identified as the primary threat to European peace but the article actually focused upon the domestic political situation in Austria. The author pointed out that Andrássy's position in Austria was threatened by influential groups at court and in the military who wished to abandon dualism and return to a centralized form of government. Count Beust was the only member of the fronde that was named. According to this report, Beust and his allies wished to give Austrian foreign policy a radical new direction by entering into alliances with France and Italy for the purpose of waging a war of revenge against Germany. The meeting in Venice was also interpreted as a symptom of the increased influence of clerical-centralist forces in Vienna and as a first step in the creation of a »Catholic« alliance.
This very pessimistic characterization of the international situation reflected Bismarck's own concerns about developments in Austria and their possible international repercussions. But they were formulated with the obvious tactical goal of issuing a strong warning to the groups in Vienna plotting Andrássy's downfall and to Emperor Francis Joseph. The unmistakable point of the article was that the end of dualism in the Habsburg Empire would make war with Germany inevitable. Although the newspaper did not contain any open threats of preventive war against a centralist regime in Austria it was understood. A few years earlier the German chancellor had stood up in the Reichstag and declared that he would launch a pre-emptive strike at the first signs that a hostile coalition was forming 34 . Therefore when Bismarck used the pages of the Kölnische Zeitung, a paper known to be under the influence of the German government, to announce that Andrássy's fall would be interpreted in Germany as the prelude to a »Catholic« alliance the threat of military action did not have to be explicitly stated. Bismarck had also reminded Beust and his allies of German resolve to respond to the first signs of a coalition with a preemptive strike only a few weeks earlier through Russell. But to ensure that his message was not misunderstood in Vienna he repeated this warning following the publication of the article. At a soirée 
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where the article in the Kölnische Zeitung was a major topic of conversation Bismarck assured his listeners that he would immediately attack Austria as soon as he had evidence of her participation in a hostile coalition 35 . Presumably the chancellor chose such a public forum to make this policy statement in the hope that his words would find their way back to Andrassy's opponents and dampen their ardor to destroy the system of dualism. France was dealt with only marginally in the article of 5 April. The discussion of French politics focused on the Cadres law which was depicted as an ad hoc measure designed to allow France to conduct a war of revenge against Germany in the near future. The only reference to political parties in France was the claim that Gambettai apparent alliance with the Orleanists was based upon their common desire for war. There was no clear effort made at this stage in the crisis to support or combat any particular faction in France. Of course the accusation that France was preparing for war could not help but have a profound effect on French politics. Increased tensions with Germany would serve to deter French reactionaries from staging a coup. But influencing events in France was not the primary objective of this first officially inspired article.
In contrast, the more famous article in the Berlin Post which appeared four days later concentrated on using the war panic to meddle in French internal affairs. The Post was the leading organ of the Free Conservative party, Bismarck's loyal ally in the Reichstag, and was known to print the chancellor's views. Lothar Bucher, a Foreign Office official, provided the guidelines for Konstantin Roessler to write the infamous lead article of 9 April entitled »Is War in Sight?« 36 . This new piece of semi-official journalism began by endorsing the views expressed in the Kölnische Zeitung concerning Austria and Italy. However Roessler corrected the Viennese correspondent's characterization of the political situation in France. In so doing he presented an analysis of French party politics which was in reality a transparent attempt to influence public opinion in France. Roessler began this short study by claiming that the real reason for the Count of Chambord's refusal to accept the crown in October 1873 had been his realization that it would have meant war with Germany. The article then echoed Bismarck's earlier warning to Oubril after the horse embargo that MacMahon and his monarchist followers believed that a crown could only be earned on the battlefield. Because the French president and the princes of Orleans wanted a war as a means of resurrecting the monarchy in France, Roessler argued that Gambetta and the republicans could not possibly have allied with them. In fact he pointed out that a republican majority in the National Assembly would represent the best guarantee for the preservation of peace. In answer to the question posed in the title of the article, the author therefore concluded that war was indeed in sight but that it could be avoided by a speedy dissolution of the monarchist-dominated National Assembly and by the election of a republican majority to that body. The »war-in-sight« article therefore offers the most revealing insights into Bismarck's real objectives in triggering the war scare. With the help of this very public medium he sent a clear signal to the electorate and political parties in France. In the first instance Bismarck reminded them that he would view the restoration of a monarchy as a casus belli. He also emphasized that the continued presidency of Marshal MacMahon represented a threat to European peace and French security. French voters were left to conclude from these warnings that if they wished to improve relations with the German Empire and avoid being crushed in another war then they needed only to accelerate elections for a new National Assembly and then to vote for republican candidates. At the same time, Gambetta and the republicans were being cautioned about the danger of supporting the Orleanists. For their part the princes of Orleans could only conclude from the language of the Post that if they carried out their plans to seize power Bismarck would view it as a direct provocation. The primary aim of this article, and by extension the war scare, was therefore to prevent the restoration of an Orleanist monarchy in France and to undermine MacMahon's domestic position. In contrast the article contained absolutely no hint of a German wish to impose limitations on French armaments. Roessler pointed to a victory of the republicans, and not to a reduction of French military strength, as the key to securing the peace.
The impact of the article in the Post was even greater than that of its predecessor in the Cologne paper. Roessler's more open discussion of the possibility of war and the suggestion that a conflict was inevitable brought the panic to a peak 37 . Although Bismarck had little interest in ending the scare caused by the two articles, public reaction and diplomatic considerations forced the German government to respond. On 11 April Bismarck issued a semi-official dementi in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung> % . The German Foreign Office used this article to distance itself from the speculation of the Post and the Kölnische Zeitung about Austrian and Italian participation in a hostile coalition. In retracting this part of the warnings in the previous two articles the chancellor was clearly trying to reassure the governments in Vienna and Rome that he did not share the suspicions expressed in the press. He wanted to avoid damaging ties to two powers with whom Germany was still closely tied. But with regard to France he endorsed the views expressed in the Post. The article argued once again that the Cadres law showed that France was preparing for a war of revenge against Germany. This clear warning from an obviously official source was therefore hardly intended to end the panic in Paris.
But the article of 11 April did signal a shift in German tactics. France was now the sole target of German saber-rattling and the Cadres law became the focus of diplomatic and journalistic pressure from Berlin. Despite this new emphasis on the armaments issue the basic objective of supporting the republican party in France remained unchanged. In the Postarticle the German chancellor had already made MacMahon and the French monarchists appear as a threat to peace in the eyes of the French electorate. He now sought to further embarrass and possibly even cause the resignation of the French president by forcing him to make concessions to German concerns about France's rearmament program. Bismarck understood that MacMahon would probably sooner resign than capitulate to German demands. And even if the president did attempt to appease Germany he would be completely discredited in the eyes of the French electorate. But in order to generate enough political pressure to force the French president to choose between personal defeat and national security the German chancellor required international backing. Bismarck had initiated the diplomatic phase of the war scare prior to the appearance of the article in the Post. He was fortunate in having the German ambassadors to Vienna and London in Berlin on leave during the first week of April. He used the opportunity to give them detailed verbal instructions on how to treat the armaments issue after they returned to their posts 39 . Essentially both men were instructed to communicate German concerns about the Cadres law and to emphasize that Germany would not sit idly by while France completed her preparations for war. They warned that Germany would be forced to launch a preventive strike if the other powers did not take action to moderate the pace of French rearmament. Bismarck and the German foreign secretary, Bernhard von Biilow, supported these initiatives by repeating this warning in conversations with Russell and the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Alois Karolyi 40 . Crown Prince Frederick William, who left Berlin on an unofficial visit to Italy at the beginning of April, carried a similar message to King Victor Emmanuel and his ministers 41 .
Bismarck attached particular importance to securing English support for his campaign to politically embarrass MacMahon on the armaments question. His attempts to gain the cooperation of Great Britain were not restricted to threats of unilateral military action against France. He also strove to exploit England's strategic interest in preserving Belgium's independence. At various times during the crisis he let it be known in London that the French attack on Germany, which he pretended was imminent, would be made in violation of Belgian neutrality 42 . The German chancellor believed that the English government's wish to avoid being dragged into a continental war to protect Belgium would cause it to seek a moderation of France's rearmament plans in order to preserve the peace. At the same time Bismarck used the on-going tensions between Germany and Belgium to make more direct threats. He warned London that Germany was losing interest in Belgium's fate and hinted that he would be inclined to sacrifice her to France to avoid another war. These threats were made most openly in the German semi-official press 43 and were clearly intended to underline Britain's interest in preventing a new Franco-German conflict. However all of this intimidation did little to win English support.
But the power that could potentially have had the greatest impact on the outcome of Bismarck's attempt to use the arms question to influence French domestic politics was Russia. The chancellor therefore used the first available opportunity to appeal for Russian pressure on MacMahon. General Bernhard von Werder, the German military plenipotentiary in St. Petersburg, returned to Russia in the middle of April from a short leave in Berlin with special verbal instructions from Bismarck 44 . Without conveying the impression that he was acting under orders Werder sought to convince tsar Alexander II that the Cadres law represented a threat to Germany and that she might therefore be forced to launch a pre-emptive strike in self-defense. He also pointed out that Andrassy's position in Vienna was precarious and that his fall might lead to war. Werder's arguments were intended to play on the Russian emperor's strong desire to preserve the peace. Bismarck hoped that the tsar might be moved by Werder's words to convince the French government to slow the pace of its armaments program in order to avoid a new war. Apparently he also thought that Alexander Π might be in a position to exert some influence on Austrian reactionaries and thereby prevent Andrássy's overthrow. However Werder's mission only served to increase growing Russian anxiety about German intentions toward France.
While these discussions with foreign governments were taking place the chancellor exerted direct pressure on France. Initially the German Foreign Office was quite restrained in its discussions of the armaments question with French diplomats 45 . Characteristically the only suggestion that Germany might take military action against France was made in reference to French domestic politics. In the course of an exchange about French armaments Biilow warned the French ambassador that the greatest threat to peace was posed by the forces of reaction, the »ultramontane party«. However there was little hint of the threats and accusations voiced in the semi-official press. Of course the talk of a pre-emptive strike in Vienna, St. Petersburg and London was doubtless also intended for French ears. But these warnings were indirect and unofficial. This cautious approach was abandoned toward the end of April 1875. On 21 April Joseph Maria von Radowitz, the head of the department of Eastern affairs in the Foreign Office, had a lengthy conversation with the French ambassador in Berlin, the Viscount de Gontaut-Biron 46 . In the course of this meeting Radowitz argued that the French military build-up made it a Christian duty for Germany to attack France before her preparations were complete. Although it is unclear whether Radowitz was authorized to make this indiscretion it certainly fit into Bismarck's overall strategy of forcing MacMahon to make concessions on the armaments issue. But this initiative quickly showed how politically dangerous such direct German threats were. In the hands of a skilled diplomat like the Due Decazes they became a weapon to win international sympathy for France and prepare the ground for a German diplomatic defeat.
In creating and maintaining the atmosphere of impending war Bismarck not only made use of his diplomatic agents. He also enlisted the assistance of Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff. In April and May 1875 Moltke repeatedly made his case for the need to take military action against France to soldiers and diplomats in Berlin 47 .
On these occasions he argued that the French rearmament program was directed at preparing for immediate war and that this gave Germany no choice but to pre-empt a French attack. These comments served to keep the war scare alive and gave greater credibility to the warnings made by Germany's ambassadors abroad. Moltke also openly appealed for international pressure on France to moderate the pace of her arms program. His participation in the war scare therefore probably occurred at the request of Bismarck. Presumably the field marshal hoped that his warnings would help to generate enough support from the other powers to slow down French military preparations.
But for Bismarck the prospect of securing French concessions on the armaments issue was a secondary consideration. From his point of view the uproar over the Cadres law was important only in so far as it offered an opportunity to embarrass MacMahon and to support the republican party under Leon Gambetta. He believed that even a powerful French army would not represent a threat to Germany as long as France remained diplomatically isolated 48 . And it was precisely to ensure that this situation continued that Bismarck was so interested in French and Austrian domestic politics. He viewed the republican and dualistic constitutions as the best guarantees of peace and was determined to prevent them from being abandoned. His protests regarding French armaments were merely a means to achieve this more important political end. The chancellor strove to force MacMahon to moderate the French arms program in order to defeat the forces of anti-republicanism in France.
Those historians who believe that Bismarck was seeking to impose permanent restrictions on French military strength and to thereby reduce her to a second class power ignore two major flaws with this explanation. Firstly neither Bismarck nor any other statesman seriously believed that such an objective was realizable. The other powers were already nervous about German predominance on the continent. None of them could possibly have sanctioned restrictions on French arms which would have only reinforced Germany's preeminence. As the chancellor discovered, it was not even possible to secure enough international support to force the limited French concessions he was seeking for purely political reasons. In addition Bismarck himself rejected arms limitations as impractical and unenforceable. In 1871 French peace negotiators had expected that Bismarck would demand limits on France's armed forces along the lines of the peace of Tilsit 49 . But the German chancellor made no demands of that nature. In view of the fate of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris Bismarck's reluctance to place similar terms in the Peace of Frankfurt is understandable. The primacy of political over military factors in Germany strategy during the war scare becomes even clearer when one examines its climax and aftermath.
The crisis reached its peak in the first days of May. Bismarck's efforts to stir up international opposition to French military preparations were building up to the presentation of a formal German protest over the Cadres law in Paris. But when the German ambassador finally communicated a dispatch expressing concern over the pace of French rearmament on 5 May it was completely anti-climactic 50 . There was no international backing for the German position and therefore little pressure on the French government to take any action. The campaign to compromise MacMahon's position in France by forcing him to back down on the armaments question had failed. In fact the communication of the German despatch only served to support the much more successful efforts of the French government to use the whole affair to damage Bismarck's own prestige. Decazes had already exploited Radowitz's theoretical musings about preventive war to alert the other powers to the danger posed by Germany. This new German step provided him with more evidence of Bismarck's hostile intentions toward France and supported his appeals to the other powers to join together to restrain Germany. But Decazes's diplomatic maneuvering was largely superfluous. Bismarck's words and actions had already succeeded in triggering an international reaction against his bullying and scare tactics. Statesmen in England had become particularly agitated over Bismarck's threatening posture towards Belgium. They feared that Germany might carry out her threats of preventive war and that a German strike would involve a violation of Belgian neutrality. For his part the tsar was enraged by the conduct of Bismarck whom he now regularly compared with Napoleon 51 . Alexander II also took German threats of a preventive strike against France seriously. Leaders in both countries therefore decided to make a joint declaration during a visit by the tsar in Berlin on 10 May expressing their concern about the possibility of war and their resolve to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. The Anglo-Russian action completed Bismarck's diplomatic defeat. He had suffered the political humiliation which had been planned for MacMahon.
Most of the details regarding the Anglo-Russian demarche of 10 May have been recounted elsewhere in great detail 52 . But one very important aspect of the ensuing discussions between Bismarck and Gorchakov has been largely ignored. French armaments were not a major topic of discussion. In fact the German chancellor declared that the Cadres law did not pose a threat to Germany and that even if it did, no power had the right to prevent France from creating a strong army. Bismarck stressed that his real concerns had nothing to do with armaments, but with developments in French and Austrian domestic politics 53 . With regard to the Habsburg Empire he repeated his fears that Andrássy's fall from power and his replacement by a clerical-centralist regime would lead to war. In the case of France, Bismarck warned Gorchakov that a French government which encouraged »ultramontane« agitation would be viewed by Germany as a direct provocation. With this statement the chancellor was continuing his efforts to secure Russian support for his intimidation of reactionary forces in France. Up until that point he had relied on the armaments question to convince Russian leaders that MacMahon and the French royalists were plotting a new war. His introduction of Roman Catholicism as the major threat to peace after the failure of this approach occurred for purely tactical reasons. Bismarck correctly calculated that the Russian chancellor would be more inclined to echo German warnings in France regarding the danger of political Catholicism than the real German concerns over anti-republican plots. And this new tactic proved to be successful. Gorchakov was so impressed by the seriousness of Bismarck's remarks on this subject that he warned the French government to avoid taking any actions on the religious front which might cause offense in Berlin. The Russian warning was so vague that it could refer to a broad range of political events, including a restoration of the monarchy and therefore caused some alarm in Paris. Thus, in a way, Bismarck salvaged a tactical victory by enlisting limited Russian support for his efforts to influence French domestic politics.
In the following years Bismarck offered many different explanations for the unusual events of 1875. In a speech on 9 February 1876 he blamed most of the excitement on the press, upon which he denied having any influence 54 . He also hinted that the French ambassador and the German empress had played a major role in spreading the panic. After his retirement the chancellor invented further versions of the causes for the crisis. Each sought to place the blame elsewhere. However none of these apologetic accounts are supported by the facts. Only one official portrait of Bismarck's motives provides a credible, albeit only partial, explanation of German tactics. In June 1875 the liberal politician Ludwig Bamberger recorded in his diary that well-informed sources were letting it be known that Bismarck had staged the entire war scare in order to save Andrássy 55 . The chancellor also did not conceal from his Austrian colleague that one of his primary objectives in raising the alarm had been to support the system of dualism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire 56 . With regard to Austria Bismarck was therefore candid in admitting that he had instigated the crisis in order to influence political developments in Vienna.
Bismarck was never as open about his real objectives vis-à-vis France. However the similarity in tactics strongly suggests that his primary goal there was also the prevention of a change of political system in favour of the forces of reaction. This interpretation of German policy also gives real meaning to the chancellor's own admission that he welcomed the war scare as a means of dousing France with a »jet of cold water« 57 . His wish to exert a sobering influence on the Orleanists who seemed to be on the verge of seizing power was certainly a major reason for triggering the panic. But Bismarck sought not only to prevent a monarchist coup. He also wished to undermine the domestic position of MacMahon and the anti-republican majority in the National Assembly. By making the Orleanists appear responsible for the panic and exerting strong pressure to force concessions on the armaments question the chancellor wanted to undermine electoral support for the reactionary forces in France. The main aim of German saber-rattling was to ensure that the French republicans won the next elections and that they were held as soon as possible.
The use of a war scare to support the republican cause in France was not unique to the events of 1875. Only a year previously the chancellor had used threats of preventive war to influence French domestic politics. During negotiations in the fall of 1873 to place the Count of Chambord on the throne France had been subjected to repeated German warnings that a restoration of the monarchy would mean war. Similar threats were made in the winter of 1873/74 when Bismarck used tensions over pastoral letters attacking the similarities between German tactics during the war scare of 1875 and the seize mai crisis in 1877. In response to an anti-republican coup by MacMahon Bismarck once again used the specter of a war with Germany to compromise French reactionaries and to pave the way for a republican victory in the fall elections of 1877 59 . Taken together all three war scares leave no doubt that the »war-in-sight« crisis was not an isolated incident. It was part of a long-term political strategy designed to support a republican government in France.
Although Bismarck made repeated use of war scares to influence domestic politics in Vienna and Paris in the period 1873-77, the effectiveness of these tactics is questionable. Andrássy, one of the intended beneficiaries of German threats in the spring of 1875, was certainly very skeptical about the efficacy of this approach. He was outraged by Bismarck's »impertinence« and feared that the belligerent German posture might achieve exactly the opposite result than was intended 60 . Presumably the Hungarian statesman feared that continual bullying by Berlin would lead the Austrian emperor and others to question the wisdom of his pro-German foreign policy. From his point of view Bismarck's scare tactics were playing into the hands of the centralists. -In the case of France the many war scares of the mid-1870s probably succeeded in convincing sections of the French electorate that a vote for the monarchists was a vote for war and thereby contributed to the final triumph of republicanism. But the impact of German threats, which is impossible to quantify, was certainly not decisive.
These limited gains were purchased at a very high political cost. Personally Bismarck suffered a major loss öf prestige in the spring of 1875 and created or at least reinforced mistrust of his policies across Europe. In particular this episode clouded Russo-German relations. Bismarck was never to forgive Gorchakov for his role in orchestrating the AngloRussian peace demonstration and this resentment intensified the animosity between both statesmen in the following years. Gorchakov's theatrics also made the Habsburg Empire under Andrassy's guidance appear to be the more reliable ally 61 . But the importance of this incident should not be over-estimated. Alexander II was certainly incorrect in 1878 when he blamed the estrangement between Germany and Russia after 1875 upon Bismarck's bruised ego 62 . Even before May 1875 Bismarck had been intriguing to overthrow Gorchakov for political reasons and there is no evidence to suggest that he allowed his personal feelings to dictate German policy.
The war scare of 1875 did not therefore have any major long-term impact on the course of European history. But it is nevertheless important because it throws some interesting light on the nature of Bismarckian foreign policy in the mid 1870s. At one level it reaffirms the generally held view that the basic goal of German diplomacy was the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the status quo -even though Bismarck sometimes made warlike noises to achieve this end. However his efforts to dictate the direction of domestic politics in Vienna and Paris also reveals that Germany frequently exploited her military predominance to meddle in the affairs of neighboring countries. The threat of German military action was used repeatedly to bully and intimidate certain political factions abroad in order to forestall changes in those countries which might have threatened German interests. In effect, Bismarck used the threat of preventive war in 1875 in order to practice a kind of »preventive diplomacy«. And German intervention in the internal politics of other states was not limited to France and Austria-Hungary. In fact the most open and intense German involvement in the domestic affairs of foreign lands during this period occurred in Spain, Belgium and Italy 63 .
The decisive impact of political developments -both perceived and real -in other countries on German policy-making in the spring of 1875 also highlights the inadequacy of attempts to understand international relations within the narrow scope of »diplomatic history«. The official exchanges between governments and diplomats represent only one level of the complex interaction between modern nation states. Bismarck certainly understood this very well and the success of his foreign policy was in large part due to his ability to take into consideration the military, economic, ideological, party political as well as the purely diplomatic dimensions of Germany's relationships with other states. Uncharacteristically, Bismarck lost sight of the proper balance between these factors in 1875 and allowed himself to become entangled in a questionable effort to influence the internal affairs of two major powers. The result was a strong collective reaction by the other powers against the chancellor's disregard for the rules governing international conduct since the Treaty of Westphalia. In particular his frequent violations of the principle of national sovereignty aroused universal indignation. As a result of this embarrassing backlash the German chancellor was more cautious in his later forays into »public diplomacy« and did not permit the domestic politics of other countries to dominate German foreign policy to the extent that they did in the mid-1870s.
